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i,.:lciTpal bonds ai'e of recent p'rowth and hence
strangers to the conmmon law.,, The reason for this is,
that towns, cities and counties Vere formerly regarded
as simply governmental sections of the state and not
as having a legal existence. At a still earlier time
they 'were mere geographical divisions with absolutely
no power. But with the advancement of civilization and
a desire for better governent, we find the state grant-
ing to these subdivisions certain governmental powers to
be used in a prescribed manner. From this they have
grown into their present condition with a legal exist-
ence similar to private corporations. The same power,
which could grant to these subdivisions of state a le-
gal existence, can confer upon them additional author-
ity. This has been plainly shown by acts of legisla-
tures empowering municipalities to make contracts, the
most common of which are municipal bonds.
The litigation arising over municipal bonds, as one
would naturally expect, has not been entirely harmonious.
The Federal Courts, by applying the doctrine of estoppepl,
apparently favor the rights of bona fide holders; while
the state courts require a strict compliance with all
conditions, whether or not bona fide holders are af-
fected.
Municipal bonds as a rule have been treated as corn-
mercial paper. In ': hew York and Pennsylvania, however,
the opposite rule prevails. (Diamond vs. Lawrence Co.
; Alvord vs. Syracuse Savings Lank, 9337 Pa. St.
In England securities of this character
have been made commercial by statute. (51 Geo. Ill, ca.
64. ) Since these bonds are considered commercial pap-
or, one taking them for value,without notice of equi-
ties and before maturity is a bona fide holder. lle
acquires an absolute title which cannot be defeated
by equiti-es existing between the original parties.
The title of such a holder may, however, be defeated
b7 showing an entire absence of power on the part of the
municipality to issue the bonds. The question now pre-
sents itself, can there be a bona fide holding of munic-
ipal bonds issued without authority? The 1'ew York au-
thorities maintain that there can be no bona fide hold-
ing of such paper, within the meaning of the law applica-
ble to negotiable paper. (Cag'win vs. Town of Hancock,
1..Y. ,599. )
The Federal Courts support a similar
rule, that where there is a total want of authority
to issue such securities, there can be no bona fide hold-
ing of them. (Tvownship of East Oakland vs. Skinner, 94
U. S. , 255. ) The difference in effect between these
holdings is, that the Hew York courts maintain that if
the ,particular bonds are issued without authority, al-
though the municipality may have power to issud bonds,
there can be no bona fide holding of them. The Feder-
al Courts, on the other hand, hold that if a corporation
has power to issue bonds, there may be a bona fice hold-
ingof them, although the particular bonds in question
may have been issued without authority. (Supervisors vs.
Schenck, 5 Wall. 772. )
Want of power then is an absolute defence, whether
34 N. Y. 532.)
the action arises between the original parties,or, where
the bonds are taken with notice, or between the cor-
poration and a bond fide holder. In an action to re-
cover on municipal bonds, the plaintiff must allege in
his complaint sufficient facts to enable the court to
decide for itself whether ornot the municipality had
authority to issue them. (Hopper vs. Covington, 1.8 U. S.
148.) Want of power to issue bonds generally arises
from the following causes:-
1. Because the bonds are issued for a private and not
for a public purpose.
2. Where the enabling statute is in violation of some
provision of the State Constitution.
3. In case the power exercised is different from that
delegated.
6
4. Where the enablinp act imposes conditions to the
exercise of the power.
The question whether an enterprise, which has been
aided by municipal bonds, is public or private, has
raised imany interesting questions of constitutional law.
Araong others the right of taxation has been indirectly
involved. if a municipal corpor'-tion has fancAs out of
which its obligations can be satisfied without resort
to taxation, there is no doubt but that it may issue its
bonds to a private enterprise which may result in pub-
lic benefit. But municipal bonds, as a general rule,
are paid by taxes raised from the people, living under
the municipal governtrient. Hence the power to issue
bonds rests, first of all, upon the authority of the
municipality to levy taxes. The power of taxation can
be exercised alone for public purposes. Loan Associa-
tion vs. Topeka, 20 Wall. 055.) This principle is uni-
versally accepted as correct, but difficulty is found
in its application to particular cases.
The constitutions of all states contain a provis-
ion for the prttection of private property, which pro-
vide that it shall not be taken for public uses without
just compensation. It necessarily falls upon the
courts to determine whether the purpose for which the
property is taken is public or private. If the duty
of construing the constitution vested in the legislature,
as was erroneously held by some early cases, it would
afford little protection to en individual or his proper-
ty. (Vanck vs. Smith, 5 Paige, 16o.)
The courts have labored under many 'ifficulties
in determi-ining whether enterprises aided by municipal-
ities qere public or private. Each emterprise must
rest solely upon its relation to the public. The New
York courts hold that a benefit to be public must be
direct and ir.nediate from the purpose to which the aid
is given, and that if merely collateral the purpose is
private, and bonds issued for such a purpose are void.
Weismer vs. Douglass, 64 !. Y. 91. Judge Black in
Shappless vs. Mayor, 21 Pa. St. 47, formulated a compre-
hensive but cumbersome definition of publis purposes.
This definition includes, among other enterprises, rail-
roads, bounties and colleges. Bonds issued in aid of
bounties and colleges have been rpoved against upon the
groung that the burden was imposed upon a few persons to
At present such purposes are i-eld to bebenefit all.
public, ari bonds issued in aid of them valid.
settled that bonus issued in aid of a railroad
are issued for a public purpose. The question has been
thoroughly litigated and the ground yielded only after
a bitter contest. in Vichigan the proposition is denied
and bonds are held void as well as the statute author-
izing the subscription. (People vs. Salem, 20 rich.
452.) The Federal Courts deny the M.ichigan doctrine.
(Pine Grove Twonship vs. Taleott, 19 Wall. 660.)
In loxa the decisions have not been finn, holding
in the first instance that bonds issued in aid of a
railroad were valid(Clapp vs. Ceder Co. 5 Iowa, 15);
then that such bonds w-ere void (Hanson vs. Vernon, 27
Iowa, 28), and later maintaining their validity. (Stew-
art vs. Polk Co. 0 Iowa, 9.)
well
It is
A C-Listinction was at one time made between donation
and subscription by a municipality to the stock of a
railroad. (Whiting vs. The S. & F. R. R. Co., 25 Wis.
167; Sweet vs. lulbert, 51 Barber, 312.), Bonds do-
nated were held void, but if the municipality become a
stockholder they were valid. No such distinction now ex
ists. (Town of Queensbury vs. Culver, 19 Wall. 03.)
in Goddin vs. Crump, 3 Leigh. (Va.) 120, decided in
1837, for the first time the attention of the court was
called to municipal bonds issued in aid of a railroad.
This case held that the legislature had power to author-
ize a municipality to aid by the use of its bonds, in-
stitjtions which were of a public nature, and a railroad
1vas held to be a public purpose.
Railroads first nade their appearance in the courts
11
of w York in Beekman vs. The Saratoga & Schenectady
3 Paiges Chan. star p. 45
Rail'oau,, (eciued in 1831. Although t!ae subject of
mumicipal bonds vs not r-ised in .his case, jet the
good Chancellor* helcL decidedly teat railroads were public
institutions; so when the age of municipal bond litiga-
tion arrived, this decision furnished the ground upon
which railways were easliy proven public enterprises,
and the validity of bonds issued in thekr behalf sus- 'z
tained.
By the laws of 77ew York, 1369, ch. 907, all munic-
ipal corporations were authorized to aid railroads by
the use of their bonds.
plying to the whole state.
This was a public statute ap-
Section eteven of Article
eight of the Constitution of p!ew York abrogates this
statute, and municipalities now have no power to aid
Could this amendment have been made
directly after the decision in Beekman vs. The Saratoga
etc., R. R. Co., it would have prevented many exorba-
tant taxes and hosts of litigation. The history of the
litigation and legislative enactments in >ew York, is
the history of the same in nearly every state in the
Union. Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, M.issouri and
A1ississippi have followed New York, and amended their
constitutions, restricting the power of the legislature
to authorize, or of municipalities to aid these enter-
prises. The necessity of restrictions of this nature
is very apparent, and it is but a matter of time when
it will be adopted by all states. in many instances
judges as well as tax-payers have arrived at this con-




13 Kas. 184, while laboring under the force of previous
decisions, and in speaking of voting to aid railroads,
said, "Look not, thou, upon the voting railroad bonds
when it is new, for at last it biteth like a serpant
and stingeth like an adder."
If then, it appear to the court tht the bonds have
been subscribed for a private and not a ptblic purpose,
it will be an absolute defence, relieving the munici-
pality from all obligations under such cuntract; whether
the bonds have not yet been delivered or whether deliv-
ered and in the hands of third parties. (Uole vs. La
Grange, 113 U. S. 1; Fieldman vs. Charleston, 55 Arm.
Rep. 6; Loan Association vs. Topeka, 20 WVall. 655.)
2. Want of power often arises where the enabling stat-
ute is in violation of some provision of the State con-
stitution.
The authority of the legislature to pass laws is
derived from the people, whose will is declared in the
constitution. Therefore, a law to be vail must
follow their will. The conflict between the enabling
act and the constittution may arise out of some provis-
ion affecting the passage of all laws, or sane provis-
ion applying directly or indirectly to the issue of mu-
nicipal bonds.
The enabling act qiay be invalid as well as the bonds
issued in pursuance of it, when the legislators fail to
observe the provisions of the constitution which require,
(a) the ayes and nays to be called and entered on the
journals of both houses; (b) that a majority shall vote
for the law; (c) that the object of the law shall be ex-
pressed in the title, and that it shall contain but one
subject; (d) that the bill shall be sifned by the pre-
siding officer of each house; (e) that the bill before
it becomes a law shall be read a certain number of times.
it is a very common provision inaj state constitu-
tions that thet vote shall be taken by ayes and nays and
recorded in the journal. Such a provision is found in
the Constitution of 7ew York. (Art. IllI, Sec. 15.) it
is held in this state that a person must plead the fail-
,ie to record the ayes and nays, as required by the con-
stitution, if he would take advantage of it. (People vs.
Sup. Chenango Co. , 3 I. Y. , 617. ) The provision of the
Illinois constitution, requiring the ayes and nays to be
recorded, is held to be mandatory and bonds issued in
pursuance of a law passed without observing this pro-
vision are void. (Spangler vs. Jacoby, 14 1il. 297. )
In some of the states the provision as to reco-cuing the
ayes and nays is held to be simply directory. Londs
issued by virtue of a law defective for thiis reason are
held valid in hands of bona fide holders. (Peopie vs.
Sup. Chenango Co., 3 N. Y. 317. ) The _Vrmnsas constitu-
tion requires on the final passage of a law that the ayes
and nays shall be called. The courts held a law passed
without conforming to this constit-,uional provision to be
valid. (Coounty of Leavenworth vs. Barnes, 94 U. S.
71.) In order that this defect constitute an absolute
defence on the part of the municipality, the court must
construe the provision as mandatory and not merely di-
rectory.
A more conmmon constitutional provision is one re-
quiring a majority, or certain number of the representa-
tives to vote for a law. Ily the Constitution of 1,1ew
York, (Art. 111, Sec. 21) three-fifths of all the mem-
bers elct to either house are necessary to pass a law im-
posing: a tax. in People vs. Allen, 42 . Y., 373, the
non-compliance wit;- a-. provision, similar to the one
under consideration, was held to invalidate the law.
The provision was declared mandatory, and not directory
as in the case of the provision requiring the ayes and
nays to be recorded. It is quite generally held that
municipal bonds are void which are issued by force of an
enabling statute passed, not observing the constitution-
al provisions as to the required number of 'otes.
(c) A constitutional provision frequently violated is
one requiring the object of the law to be expressed in
the title, and that it shall embrace but one subject.
At one time it was the practice to include in a sinple
act m"any matters having no connection whatever. This
species o statute is known in Enp:land as a "hedge podge"
act. The title to laws was formerly prefixed by the
Clerk and was considered of no inportance. in some
states a reform has been made in this respoct by consti-
tutional provision.
The tit, le should fairly express the general or
leading object of. the act. (Bur-oughs on Public Security,
421) The statute may contain various matter if they are
incident to the primary object of the act. (ibid.)
If there appear to be more than one object in both tit-
le and act, the statute will be void. (Ibid. 422) in
case the title embraces clearly one object, and the act
embraces two or more objects, it is then diffiuult to
ddtermine vhether the whole law shall fall or only a pro-
tion. Cooley lays down the rule that, "if by striking
out that portion not embraced in the title; a consistent
law capable of being executed is left; such part of the
act is valid; and that ,;jich is not embraced in the tit-
le is alone void." (Cooley's Const. Lim. 175.) The
fact that a part of a statute is unconstitutional does
not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void,
unless the provisions are so connected that it cannot be
presumed the legislature would have passed on without the
other. (People va. Briggs, 50 N. Y., 553.) Bonds
issued by virtue of the law passed ignoring this consti-
tutional provision would undoubtedly be void, though no
case has arisen in xhich failure to comply with this pro-
vision has been made a defence.
(a) The signing of all bills by the presiding officers
of both houses is made a constitutional provision in
some states. Provisions of this kind are found in the
constitutions of Illinois, Nevada and Arkansas. Laws
which are passed, ignoring this provision, are void as
well as the bonds issued by virtue of it. (Spangler vs.
Jacoby, 14 111. 297.) in Pennsylvania the constitution
contains no such provision, hence a law will be valid
though not signed by the presiding officer. (Speer vs.
Plank Road, 22 Pa. St. 376. )
(e) The constitutions of nearly all states re-
quire that a bill before becoming a law shall be read
three times. Judge Cooley says, that the object of this
provision "was to secure somethinp, more than the mere
orderly transaction of business.
ty legislation and to protect the -,eoople at large from
its effect."(Cooley's Const. Lim. 170.) The courts of
Ohio consiae , this provision as merely directory and
failu,e to comply with it does not invalidate the act.
(Pun vs. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N. S. 178.) Judge Cooley
assails this doctrine as erroneous. (Cool ey's Const.
Lim. 170. ) In Illinois it is necessary to the valid-
ity of a la&r that this provision be observed by the leg-
islators. (Ryan vs. Lynch 68 Ill. 160.)
Constitutional provisions which directly or indi-
rectly affect the issue of municipal bonds.
First, as to provisions which existed at the time
power to issue bonds was granted to the municipality;
second as to restrictions of thi power of the legisla-
ture to authorize, or the municipality to aid by the
It was to preven~t has-
use of its credit.
IN Queensbury vs. Culver, 19 Wallace, 83, it is
helL that the constitutional prohibition against taking
private property for public use does not operate to pro-
hibit municpal aid and other similar public objects.
The provisions that taxation shall be uniform has been
held not to invalidate a law authorizinr the issue of
bonds. (Pine Grove vs. Talcott, 19 Wall. 660.) The
constitutionality of acts authorizing municipal aid to
railroads, has been carrie to the extent of holding
that a county may be empowered to donate bonds to a
railroad outside of the county and even outside of the
state. (E. R.. CO. vs. County of Ote, 16 Wall. 667.)
Lut an act authorizing the issue of bonds without an
election, contrary to the constitutional prohibition,
voiCL.
void. (H II vs. Memphis, 23 Fed. 1Pep. 872. )
The effect of constitutional limitations made after
the power to issue the bonds has been given is a ques-
tion which has received much attention from the courts.
It will perhaps, be sufficient to state here, that tha
rule to be gathered from the authorities is, that if
the restriction is directed to legislative action,
it simply liiits the future action of the legislature.
While of the restriction is directed to tI-e municipality,
and there has been no actual contract of subscription un-
der the power to issue , such power is abrogated.
Unuer this rule, it may become important to know
when a contract of subscription is made. It has been
held that a vote in favor of subscription did not con-
stitute a contract; that until the subscription w;as ac-
tually made the contract was executory. (Conrad vs.
Savings Lank, 92 U. S. 025.) The resolutions or ordi-
nances of a municipality will be treated as a subscrip-
tion when so intended, and upon acceptance will consti-
tute a contract. (Ibid. 631.) The delivery to the rail-
road Company by the proper officer a d their acceptance
by the company will amount to a subscription. (East Lin-
coln vs. Davenport, 94 U. S. 801.) Where there is an
agreement to subscribe upon the performace of certain
conditions, and the bonds are placed in the hands of a
third party to be delivered when the conditions are per-
formed, does not constitute a complete subscription, and
the contract will be affected by subsequent legislation.
(Falconer vs. The D. E. & J. P. R. Co. , 69 11. Y. , 491. )
3. Where the power exercised is different from that de?
delegated.
The exercise of power different from that which is
delegated, usuaaly arises whre the object intended to be
aided is divided into two or more; or consolidated with
another enterprise, and the aid is given to the newly
created corporation, or corporations as the case may be.
In 1,arsh vs. Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676, the bonds
were authorized to be issued to one railroad corporation,
but before they were issued the corporation divided into
three independent corporations and the bonds were deliv-
ered to one of them. They were held voiad, having been
authorized in aid of one object and delivered to another.
The same principle was applied to consolidated roads in
Harshman vs. Bates County, 92 U. S. 569. The election
was held to subscribe to the stock of the Lexington,
Chillicothe & Gulf * . ., the bonds were issued to the
Lexington L. & G. R. R., which was formed by the consol-
idation of the forner with anotl-r road. The subscrip-
tion ;vas made by the county on behalf of the township.
Litigati-n arising over the bonds, they were held void
on the ground that thet authority to subscribe was re-
vokeu before it had been executed, by the extinction of
the first corporation. At this point the decisions
turned, and in County of Scotland vs. Thomas, 94 U. S.
682, the opposite rule is laid down and has been with-
out exception followea by later decisions. (Nelson vs.
Salamanca, 99 Us S. 499; Empire vs. Dailington, 101 U. S.
87; LiVingston Co. vs. Portsmouth Bank, 128 U. S. 102.)
Mr. Justice Bradley wrote the decisions in the Bates and
Thomas County cases, and Iie points out as a distinctio~i,h
that in the furrier the county acted as agent for the
township and had no discretion to act be-ond the pre-
cise terms of the power given. In the latter case the
county subscribed for itself and, acting in the capacity
of principal could subscribe ov- reject,as it thought best.
The Scotland County case inaicates that if a municipal
corporation has power to subscribe to a railroad, it
is a privilege--a vested right--which may be exercised
by the new corporation in defiance of the will of tie
people. Such is not the hulding in the United States
Courts, neither is it followed in Lew York. (People vs.
Bac,ellor, 53 11. Y., 123.)
The consolidated company will have no right to the
benefit of a subscription to the stock of a component
corporation, unless the act allowing the consolidation
it
vesteLAwith such rights. (S-iields vs. Ohio, 95 U. S. -l0)
After a careful review of the authorities, the followin-
seems to be the true rule: If the act authorizing th-
consolidation fails to invest the neV cdrporation with
the riPhts of the olu corporation , it can have no in-
te 'est in a subscription to the latter. If the sub-
scription was not an executeu contract, creating a vest-
ed right, the consolidated company coald not be a_ thor4
ized to receive the benefit under the sabscription.
But, on the other, hand, if the old corporation had ac-
quired a vested right, or had bonds issued to it, such
right would pass to the now corporation.
4. Where the enabling act imposes conditions to the
exercise of the power.
Since municipal corporations must have an express
authority to issue b~nds, it is not infrequent that at-
tached to this authority are conditions which must be
performed before the bonds can lawfully issue. The
conditions most commonly imposed are; an election bY
the people; written assent of tax-payers; location of the
road in a particular place; or completion at a certain
time and its corporate existence. These are conditions
precedent, and until they are performed, the right to
issue the bonds does not arise.
As t- the perfornance of conditions precedent, much
diversity exists in opinion between the Federal and
State Courts. At every opportunity the Federal Counts
have interposed tihe doct iine of estoppal in behalfY of
bona fide holders. This accounts for nearly all tIh
municipal bonds litigation being acarried on the the
United States Courts.
When an election is required before the bonds are
isiued and a majority are required to vote in favor of
the propoeition, such a vote is essential to give the
officers jurisdiction to act. (Lenox vs. Corn. of Bour-
bon, 12 Kas. 149.) Where the question as t( the per-
fonniance of the condition is raised between the orig-
inal partues or between the municipality and one taking
with notice of the ctefect, and not deriving his title
through a bona fide holder, this doctrine is agreed in
by both State and Federal Courts, but from this point
they cease to coincide. The state courts maintain
that the holder must take notice of all defects in the
issue of the bonds. The Federal Courts apply the doe-
trine of estoppel and hold the municipality concluded
by its own acts, or by aecisions of the officers (
whose duty it was to issue the bonds, and by recitals
in the bonds. (Dillon on Mun. Corp. Secs. 518, 519. )
Tlhis rule of the United States Court was first advanced
in the celebrated case of Knox Co. vs. Aspinwall, 21
How. 539. The action was bz'oupht by a bona fide holder
to recover on certain coupons attached to bonds issued
by Knox County in aid of a railway company. The defence
up
setAwas, that the sheriff whose duty it was to give no-
tice of the election, failed to give the notice required
by statute; that this defect invalidated the election;
that the comissioners had no authority to act in ccnse-
quence of such an election, and that the bonds issued
wei'e therefore void. The court held, that this defence
be
would A decisive were it not' for the fact that the corinnis-
sioners, who issued the bonds were the sole judges as to
whether they were la..'rfully issued.
courts by the intervention of estoppel, overthrow a de-
fence sufficient in a majoirity of the state courts.
This decision, Knox vs. Aspinwall, though affirined
by all subsequent cases in our Federal Courts would ap-
parently be a dangerous precedent to establish. Carry-
ing out the theory advanced in that case no reason
appears why under a public statute the commissioners could
not at their pleasure issue bonds without observing any
of the formalities of the law, and thereby bind the mu-
nicipal corporatiion.
The state courts, with scarcely an exception, have
laid down the opposite rule and hold all bonds void which
are issued in pursuance of an election hela without ob-
serving the conditi6ns imposed by law. (Lewis vs. Eourbon
Thus the Fe)deral
County, 12 Kas. 150; J. t . S. & R. Co. vs. Town of Vir-
den, 104 Ill. 335; People vs. 1Meadd, 124 'T. Y. 114.)
The burden of showing that the bonds were issued in com-
pliance with a vote of the people rests upon those af-
firming their validity. (Jackson Co. vs. Brush, 77 Ill.
l l.
In the State of 1Lew York, statutes authorizing the
bonding of municipla corporation in aid of rail .ays,
requires in place of an election, the consent of a cer-
tain proportion of the tax payers to be given in writ-
ing. in this State, the aid extended to a railway is
considered as a contiact between a majority of the tax-
payers ana the railroad. This power conferred on a
majority to mortgage the property of all,against the will
of the minority,was unknown to tiie common law, and de-
pends solely on statutory enactment and therefore, every
stpp required by the statute must be taken in strict
conpliance with it. (Burioughs on Publie Securities, 202.)
The New York Courts, going behind the decisions of
the orricers whose duty it is to determine when the cond-
tions are perforned, require the holder, if he would re-
cover/ on the bonds, to prove affirmatively the assent
uf the tax-payer to the proposition. (Gould vs. Town
of Sterling, 23 1,. Y., 404; People vs. L',eade, 24 Nc Y.
114.) The United States Courts in Tovm of Venice vs.
Lfurdock, 92 U. S. 494, in a very able opinion wi-itten
by Mr. Justice Strong, criticises this holding of the
NTew York Court of Appeals, and lays dovm the rule that
a holder may rest upon showing the decision of til of-
ficers. Continuing the learned Justice states, "No sane
person would have boupht a bond with such an obligation
resting upon him whenever he called for payment of in-
terest. If such was the duty of the holder, it was
always his duty. It could not be perfoirmed once for all,
The bonds retained in the hands of the company woild have
been no help. in the construction of the road. I t was
only because they could be sold that thev were valua-
ble." The New York rule has been criticised by the
courts of other states. (Society for Saving vs. New Lon-
don, 29 Conn. 174; Commissioners vs. Nicholas 14 Ohio
t. 260.) Judge Co-ley considers the doctrine of the
1,ew York Courts as sound. Cooloey's Con. Lim. 4th Ed.
p. 268.
Where the bonds are issued in aid of a railway the
completion and location as well as its corporate ex-
istence are often made condition precedent.
is not locatea op, completed as agi'eed, the bonus in
the hands of hona fide holders are generally held to
be void, and in all cases the tax payer can prevent
the issud of b'nds where the condition imposed has not
been complied with. (Germans Savings Lank vs. Franklin
Co. 128 U. S. 526; R. R. Co. vs. Hartford, 58 MIe. 23;
State vs. Davies, 64 Mo. 30.) If the condition is the
location of the road in a particular place the state
courts require a strict compliance with the condition
(Aurora vs. West, 22 Ind. 83); while the Federal Courts
hold that a practical compliance is sufficient. (John-
s.n Co. vs. Thayer, 94 U. S. 631.)
A condition which arises of itself and is not gen-
erally founds in acts or imposed by tax-payers is that
If the road
there must be a corporation before a conti'-ct can be
made with it. As a geheral rule corporations must file
a certificate of incorporation as a requisite to legal
existence. If the subscription was made before the cer-
tificate of incorporation was filed, anu while the cor-
poration was in an imcomplete form the, bonds issued would,
no doubt, be void. (Ruby vs. Spain, 54 MIo. 207.) Such
a rule is hinted at in the case of Davies vs. Hendekoper,
93 U. S. 104, by 11r. Justice Strong. In this case the
election to issue binds was held while the corporation
was incomplete, but the certificate of incorporation
was filed bef re the subscription was actually made.
Subscription is the actual contract and if the purposes
intended to be aid have a legal existence at that time
it is sufficient.

